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THE MARYLAND COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL 
DISABILITIES: WHITHER THOU GOEST? 
Hon. Glenn T. Harrell, Jr.1 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT ORGANIZATIONS: WHERE DID THEY 
COME FROM? 
Specialized judicial conduct organizations are a 
relatively recent development. 2 The last three decades 
have witnessed the most intense and widespread public 
interest in the discipline ofjudges.3 Scholars who have 
studied the issue point primarily to a combination of 
two factors: (1) the increased scrutiny of public offi-
cials, and (2) the public dissatisfaction with the tradi-
tional common law procedures that were used to deal 
with judicial misconduct and disability. 4 
The traditional method for dealing with judicial 
misconduct had been impeachment. 5 By 1960, howev-
er, there was a feeling throughout the country that 
impeachment was "too tedious, too cumbersome, and 
too expensive for frequent use" and no longer offered 
a viable mechanism for judicial discipline.6 
Furthermore, impeachment offered little procedur-
al protection for the judge, and the only remedy it 
provided was removal. A principal problem with 
impeachment proceedings is that they are conducted in 
a partisan atmosphere and tend to become politically 
charged. Legislators may be motivated by factors other 
than the merits of the case.7 As a result, legislators and 
citizens initiated impeachment only in cases offlagrant 
misconduct. 8 Most jurisdictions, therefore, employed 
informal methods of discipline. 9 Informal tactics such 
as peer pressure however, did not work with an obsti-
nate judge, and administrative or judicial actions such 
as reassignment or reversal might correct a judge for 
minor episodes of misconduct, but could not affect the 
manner of an incurable one. IO 
A. State Courts 
In search of a better solution, California, in 1960, 
became the first state t.o establish a permanent formal 
system for regulating judicial conduct. II This agency, 
called the California Commission on Judicial Qualifica-
tions, had· express authority to receive and review 
complaints against judges, to conduct inquiries and 
make investigations, and to dispense disciplinary rec-
ommendations when necessary.12 Six states acted 
quickly to adopt the California prototype, making the 
change between 1960 and 1966. Twenty-one acted 
between 1967 and 1972 and twenty-one have acted 
since 1973. \3 Today, forty-eight states and the District 
of Columbia have established similar agencies and make 
recommendations for disposition. 14 About half the 
states have created commissions by constitutional 
amendment, the remainder have done so by court rule 
or the enactment of statutory provisions. 15 
Since California's creation of its Commission on 
Judicial Qualifications, two forms of state judicial com-
missions have evolved: (1) the unitary commission, and 
(2) the two-tier commission. 16 Most states have mod-
eled their agencies after California's"unitary commis-
sion." Unitary commissions are usually staffed by an 
executive director or executive secretary and serve as 
permanent visible agencies with authority to receive and 
review complaints against judges, conduct investiga-
tions, convene formal hearings, and make disciplinary 
·recommendations to the state's supreme court. 17 
Some states instead have adopted a "two-tier" 
commission, whereby the investigative and adjudica-
tive functions are divided between two entities. 18 The 
commission receives and investigates complaints, and if 
there is probable cause that grounds exist for disciplin-
ary action or removal, the commission presents the 
charges to a separate permanent board or court for the 
adjudicatory process. 19 
B. Federal Courts 
Federal courts also have adopted methods for reg-
ulating judicial conduct. 20 Rather than specifically 
created and tenured commissions, the federal courts 
have relied on established agencies of the federal judi-
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cial administration to deal with alleged incapacity or 
errant behavior on the part of their members. Two 
statutorily created agencies share this responsibility: 
(1) a national body, the Judicial Conference of the 
United States,21 which is staffed by the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts, and (2) judicial 
councils, which are responsible for the administration of 
the eleven regional circuits.22 
The rules of the Fourth Circuit's Judicial Council, 
for example, state that upon receipt of a complaint 
against a judge, the chief judge, upon reviewing the 
complaint, will determine whether it should be: (1) 
dismissed, (2) concluded on the ground that corrective 
action has been taken, (3) concluded because interven-
ing events have made action on the complaint no longer 
necessary, or (4) referred to a special committee. If the 
chief judge dismisses a complaint or concludes that no 
further action is necessary, the complainant may peti-
tion for review to the judicial council. The judicial 
council can then "affirm the order of the chief judge, 
return the matter to the chief judge for further action, or, 
in exceptional cases, take other appropriate relief. "23 
II. THE MARYLAND COMMISSION ON ruDI-
CIAL DISABILITIES 
In 1966, Maryland became the fifth state to adopt a 
judicial conduct commission.24 Created by constitu-
tional amendment,25 Maryland's Commission on Judi-
cial Disabilities was modeled after California's unitary 
commission. Prior to the creation of the Commission, 
Maryland's methods of dealing with disabled and errant 
judges were typical of most states. Maryland's Consti-
tution, art. IV, § 4, sets forth the constitutional methods 
for the removal ofjudges.26 In 1905, in Warfield v. 
Vandiver,21 the Court of Appeals concluded that art. IV, 
§ 4 provided three ways to remove an incompetent or 
disabled judge: (1) removal by the Governor, (2) im-
peachment under Md. Const. art. III, § 26, or (3) by 
two-thirds vote of the General Assembly. With the 
creation ofthe Commission on Judicial Disabilities, for 
the first time in Maryland there was an alternative to 
removal. 28 
A. Duties, Powers andProcedures o/the Commission29 
Either upon receipt of a verified statement or inde-
pendently on its own motion, the Commission formerly 
conducted a preliminary investigation that provided the 
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judge in question with notice and an opportunity to be 
heard. Ifa majority of the Commissioners decided that 
sufficient cause was present to warrant a formal hear-
ing, notice of the hearing was given and within fifteen 
days the judge could file an answer. At the recorded 
hearing the judge had the right to introduce and compel 
the production of evidence, be represented by counsel, 
and cross-examine witnesses. If after a hearing, a 
majority of eligible Commissioners found good cause, 
the Commission issued a reprimand or recommended 
censure, removal or other appropriate discipline or 
retirement to the Court of Appeals. 30 
The Commission's duties were clarified in two 
subsequent amendments, first in 1970 and then again in 
1974. The 1970 amendment gave the Commission the 
power to administer oaths, subpoena witnesses, require 
the production of evidence and grant immunity. 31 The 
amendment also raised the membership ofthe Commis-
sion from five to seven. 32 
The Commission normally meets monthly, though 
it has met more frequently when required by the press 
of business. Its seven members are appointed by the 
Governor for four year terms. Members include four 
judges presently serving on the bench, two members of 
the bar admitted for at least fifteen years, and one lay 
person representing the general public.33 Although the 
Commission's expenses are approved by the Chief 
Judge of the Court ofY Appeals and paid out of the 
judiciary budget, none of the Commission members 
receives a salary. The Commission does not have a 
discrete line item in the judiciary budget presently. 
Maryland's Constitution does not set forth the 
procedure to be used by the Commission in conducting 
any investigation, but confers upon it "the power to 
investigate complaints against any judge and provides 
that the practice and procedure before the commission 
shall be by rule promulgated by the Court of Appeals."34 
Maryland Rule 1227, adopted pursuant to Maryland's 
Constitution, art. 40, § 45, detailed the procedures of 
the Commission prior to July 1, 1995. The Commis-
sion's primary function was to receive and investigate 
complaints against members of the Maryland judiciary. 
Under Rule 1227, formal complaints to the Commission 
were to have been in writing and notarized, but no 
particular form was required. 35 Complaints were ac-
cepted from all sources-including members of the 
public, state and local officials, attorneys, and from 
judges themselves. In addition, the Commission could 
initiate a preliminary investigation on its own motion. 36 
The Commission handled the preliminary investiga-
tion of formal complaints in a variety of ways. Tapes 
and transcripts of hearings were obtained. When nec-
essary, attorneys and other disinterested parties who 
participated in any proceedings in question were inter-
viewed. On occasion, the Commission, as part of its 
preliminary investigation, requested a judge to appear 
before it. The Commission could investigate com-
plaints through retained counsel, conduct hearings, or 
take informal action as it deemed necessary, provided 
the subject judge had been properly notified. Ifwarrant-
ed by the preliminary investigation, formal charges were 
served upon the judge and a hearing was held regarding 
the judge's alleged misconduct or disability. 
The Court of Appeals has explained that proceed-
ings before the Commission are neither criminal nor 
civil in nature; "they are merely an inquiry into the 
conduct of a judicial officer the aim of which is the 
maintenance of the honor and dignity of the judiciary 
and the proper administration of justice rather than the 
punishment of the individual. "37 If as a result of the 
hearing( s) the Commission, by a maj ority vote, decided 
that a judge should be retired, removed, censured, or 
publicly reprimanded, it recommended that course of 
action to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals 
then could accept the Commission's recommendation 
or order a more severe discipline of the judge than that 
recommended. 38 In addition, the Commission had the 
power in certain situations to issue private reprimands 
or warnings. 
Initially, all proceedings before the Commission 
were confidential and privileged, except that a record 
filed with the Court of Appeals lost its confidential 
nature. 39 As authorized by the 1974 constitutional 
amendment, however, the Court of Appeals promulgat-
ed new rules that allowed the release of information 
concerning Commission investigations, and permitting 
the sealing of part or all of a proceeding filed with the 
Court.40 
From July 1, 1993 to June 30, 1994, the Commis-
sion considered approximately forty-seven formal com-
plaints, five of which were initiated by practicing attor-
neys and the remainder by members of the public.41 
Additionally, according to the immediate past Chair of 
the Commission, there were thirty-two complaints dur-
ing the 1994 calendar year that were summarily dis-
missed by the then Chair, after consultation with the 
Executive Secretary, because they were facially beyond 
the Commission's jurisdiction or patently failed to state 
a claim of cognizable misconduct. Further, there were 
an additional twenty complaints in 1994 that were 
dismissed as being facially frivolous. 42 
During the 1993-94 fiscal year reviewed in the 
Report of the Judiciary,43 it was noted that some of the 
forty-seven formal complaints considered were direct-
ed simultaneously against more than one judge.44 In 
several instances a single jurist was the subject of 
multiple complaints.45 In all, twenty-seven circuit court 
judges, twelve district court judges, and two orphans' 
court judges were the subject of complaints during 
1993-94.46 Four judges were requested to appear 
before the Commission to defend charges against them.47 
Most of the complaints were disposed of by way of 
discussion with the jurist involved or by a private 
warning.48 In most instances, however, complaints 
were not serious enough to warrant personal appear-
ances by judges.49 The charges were dismissed either 
because the accusations were unsubstantiated or not 
supported by evidence following investigation, or be-
cause, in the Commission members' view, the conduct 
did not amount to a breach of judicial ethics. 50 Litigation 
over family law matters, including divorce, alimony, 
and custody, precipitated some fourteen complaints; 
criminal cases accounted for ten complaints and "the 
remainder resulted from conventional civil litigation or 
the alleged prejudice or improper demeanor of some 
jurist. "51 
In addition to formal complaints, numerous individ-
uals either wrote or called the Commission's Executive 
Secretary or its Chair expressing dissatisfaction con-
cerning the outcome of a case or judicial ruling. Al-
though many of these complaints were not technically 
within the Commission's jurisdiction, the complainants 
were afforded an opportunity to express their feelings 
and frequently were informed, for the very first time, of 
their right of appeal. Thus, the Commission offered an 
additional service to members of the public. The 
Commission also supplied judicial nominating commis-
sions with confidential information concerning repri-
mands issued to, or pending charges against, those 
judges seeking nomination to higher judicial offices. 52 
B. Grounds for DiSCipline, Removal, and Retirement 
Formal ethical standards are necessary parts of any 
judicial disciplinary system. These standards help judg-
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es appraise their own conduct, provide rules that can be 
enforced through the discipline and review procedures, 
and touch on conduct which, "while not inherently 
improper, should be restricted so as to prevent the 
possibility or appearance of misconduct. "53 
Currently, the Maryland Constitution provides for 
judicial discipline in cases in which the Court of Appeals 
finds misconduct while in office, persistent failure to 
perform duties required of the office, or conduct prej-
udicial to the proper administration of justice. 54 The 
ABA Code & Canons of Judicial Ethics and the ABA 
Rules of Judicial Ethics provide guidelines for inter-
preting and construing these general provisions. The 
Canons were adopted by the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland and are binding on Maryland judges as part of 
the Maryland Rules. 55 The Maryland State Bar Associ-
ation formally endorsed the original Canons ofJudicial 
Ethics in 1953. However, from 1953 untiltheMaryland 
Judicial Conference adopted the Maryland Canons in 
1970, the Canons served as mere recommendations. 
The courts had not formally adopted them, nor were 
there any enforceable procedures except through im-
peachment. Finally in 1970, the Judicial Conference 
adopted the Canons. In 1971 it adopted even more 
specific disciplinary rules that were set forth inMd. Rule 
i 23 1.56 It was then that the Canons and disciplinary 
rules of judicial ethics became formally imposed as 
enforceable rules governing judges' conduct. 57 
Md. Rule 1231 is composed of two parts. The 
Canons of Judicial Ethics make-up the first part of the 
Rule and consist of simple advisory statements. 58 The 
second part of Rule 1231, the Rules of Judicial Ethics, 
contains particular requirements and prohibitions which 
use the mandatory word "shall," as opposed to the 
Canons' permissive "should. "59 In addition, the Rules 
of Judicial Ethics contain specific consequences for a 
violation. 60 
In several instances, the Commission on Judicial 
Disabilities and the court of appeals have turned to the 
ABA Canons and Rules of Judicial Conduct for guid-
ance in deciding whether and how to discipline a judge. 61 
However, attempting to define and apply ambiguous 
phrases like "conduct prejudicial to the proper admin-
istration of justice" without some guidance from the . 
ABA's model code and annotations is difficult. 
In the Court of Appeals opinion, In re Foster,62 the 
ABA Code ofJudicial Conduct was quoted favorably in 
construing the phrase "conduct prejudicial to the prop-
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er administration of justice. "63 Deciding to censure 
Judge Foster, the Commission on Judicial Disabilities 
found by clear and convincing evidence that Judge 
Foster had utilized his office to persuade others to 
contribute to the success of a private business venture. 64 
The Court concluded that, since the establishment of the 
Commission on Judicial Disabilities in 1966, it had been 
possible to discipline a Maryland judge for "misconduct 
while in office" or "conduct prejudicial to the proper 
administration of justice" because objective standards 
defining these terms were available in the ABA's Can-
ons of Judicial Ethics. 65 Judge Foster was censured for 
his active participation in a rezoning petition involving 
land in another jurisdiction in which he held an option. 66 
Although the Court found no actual wrongdoing, it held 
that the judge's actions created the appearance of 
improperly using the prestige of his judicial office to 
achieve the desired result. 67 
Since 1966, only three judges have been removed 
from office as the result of an adjudication of judicial 
misconduct. 68 In the first removal case, In Re Diener 
and Broccolino,69 two district court judges were re-
moved from office for conduct that occurred while they 
were judges of the Traffic Division in Baltimore City. 70 
Although there was no evidence of bribery, the judges 
had routinely "fixed" or reduced fines on parking 
tickets for friends and political affiliates. 71 Although the 
Commission on Judicial Disabilities had only recom-
mended that the judges be censured, the Court of 
Appeals ordered that the judges be removed after 
determining by "clear and convincing evidence" that 
the judges were guilty of conduct prejudicial to the 
proper administration of justice. 72 
Although it is very difficult to mark the boundary 
between conduct meriting removal and conduct merit-
ing public censure, an examination of reported cases to 
date suggests that there is a greater tendency to remove 
a judge for criminal actions or conduct directly affecting 
the performance of judicial duties, such as in the In re 
Diener and Broccolino case. 73 
In the second removal case, In re Bennett,74 a 
district court judge was removed from office for having 
forged a signature of another judge in order to change 
the disposition of a traffic case at the request of a 
political supporter. 75 The Commission had unanimous-
ly recommended that Judge Bennett be removed from 
office.76 In support of its decision to remove the judge, 
the Court pointed out the number of violations of the 
Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Rules of Judicial 
Ethics with which the judge was charged. n 
C. A Call for Reform: The Legislature and Judiciary 
Respond to Public Criticism 
Until fairly recently, Maryland's Judicial Disabili-
ties Commission operated in near-obscurity insofar as 
the public was concerned. But after one confirmed and 
another controversial, supposed complaint, the Com-
mission received unprecedented attention. Critics said 
that the Commission was "underfunded, understaffed, 
reluctant to punish and too packed with judges to render 
impartial decisions. "78 Comparisons to other states 
suggest that Maryland had, at one time, one of the least 
busy judicial discipline commissions in the country, 
according to the Center for Judicial Conduct Organiza-
tions. During the Commission's lifetime, only three 
judges have been removed as a result of its investiga-
tions, all for fixing traffic tickets. 79 For example, in the 
1992-93 fiscal year, Maryland's Commission received 
thirty-four formal complaints, fewer than panels in 
Nebraska or Alaska, whose populations are much smaller 
than that of Maryland. In contrast, New York's panel 
fielded 1,452 complaints. Of course, this may not 
reflect relatively and fairly the complete workload or 
paper flow of the Maryland Commission then or now: 
As noted from the recollections of the past Chair of the 
Commission, there were other matters that fell short of 
a "formal complaint" that occupied the Commission. 
As the old saw goes, it depends on "who is counting" 
and "what is being counted." 
Part of the new focus on the Commission is also 
attributable to the fact that in recent years there has been 
a heightened demand for public accountability on the 
part of all public officials. This new demand on judges 
can be attributed to the fact that courts are being drawn 
into the economic and social life of the community to 
deal with cases involving "complex and controversial 
questions formerly left to other public and private 
institutions to resolve. "80 This increase in "public law 
litigation" has prompted a corresponding increase in 
the demand for means to assure the judiciary's public 
accountability. 
In response to public criticism that Maryland's 
Commission is "too secretive, slow and unwilling to 
punish judicial misconduct," the General Assembly 
passed a proposed constitutional amendment in the 
1995 session that would restructure the Commission on 
Judicial Disabilities by essentially adding four additional 
lay persons to the commission. 81 The amendment goes 
to the voters in 1996.82 The proposed amendment 
would expand the Commission ·to eleven members. 83 
The Commission would then include three judges (one 
each from the appellate court, the circuit court and the 
district court, respectively), three attorneys, each of 
whom must have been admitted to practice for at least 
seven years (reduced from the current requirement of at 
least fifteen years), and five lay individuals. Race, 
gender, and geographic diversity are explicitly stated as 
goals in the appointment of future members of the 
Commission.84 The amendment also limits the duration 
of Commission membership to two, four-year terms. 85 
No change is proposed in the powers and duties of the 
Commission vis-a-vis the Court of Appeals. 
Coincidentally for the most part and concurrent 
with the processing of the legislature's proposal, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland's Standing Committee 
on Rules of Practice and Procedure sent to the Court of 
Appeals a proposal for rule changes governing the 
Commission, which does not require amending the 
constitution. On May 9, 1995, the Court of Appeals 
approved,86 with modest revisions, the Rules Commit-
tee's March 14, 1995 submission of new Rules 1227 
through 1227G. The new rules took effect on July 1, 
1995. Among the most important changes occasioned 
by the new rules were: the creation of an Investigative 
Counsel ("Counsel") position to investigate and pros-
ecute charges of misconduct; a sixty day time limit for 
the completion of preliminary investigations; and, a 
provision that once formal charges of misconduct are 
served upon a judge further proceedings in that matter 
would not maintain their confidentiality.87 
Of further note and unlike the predecessor rule, the 
new rules define both "disability" and "sanctionable 
conduct."88 The proposed rules define "disability" as 
"a mental or physical disability that seriously interferes 
with the performance of a judge's duties and is, or is 
likely to become, permanent."89 Sanctionable miscon-
duct includes: 
misconduct while in office, the persis-
tent failure by a judge to perform the 
duties of the judge's office, or conduct 
prejudicial to the proper administration 
of justice. It inchides any conduct con-
stituting a· violation of the Maryland· 
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Code of Judicial Conduct . . .. An 
erroneous ruling, finding, or decision in 
a particular case does not alone consti-
tute sanctionable conduct. 90 
Under the new rules, the procedure for the Commis-
sion is as follows. All complaints are first directed to the 
Investigative Counsel. The Counsel then opens a file on 
each complaint received and promptly acknowledges 
receipt of the complaint. 91 The new rule no longer 
requires complaints to be notarized; instead, they need 
only be verified under the penalties for petjury.92 
Upon receiving a complaint, the Counsel decides 
whether or not the complaint is "frivolous on its 
face. "93 If the Counsel concludes that a complaint is 
frivolous, the Counsel will dismiss the complaint and 
notify the complainant, the Commission, . and, upon 
request, the judge.94 If, however, the complaint is not 
"frivolous on its face" the Counsel "shall conduct a 
preliminary investigation to determine whether reason-
able grounds exist to believe the allegations of the 
complaint. "95 The preliminary investigation must be 
completed within sixty days of receipt of the complaint. 
The new rules also permit the Counsel to make inquiry 
and undertake a preliminary investigation on his or her 
own initiative, if the Counsel receives any information 
from any source indicating that a judge has a disability 
or has committed sanctionable conduct. 96 
Whenever the Counsel undertakes a preliminary 
investigation he or she is required to inform the Com-
mission promptly that an investigation is underway. 97 
Investigative Counsel, before the conclusion of the 
preliminary investigation, is required to notify the judge 
who is the focus of the investigation.98 Specifically, the 
Investigative Counsel must notify the judge of three 
items: (1) whether the preliminary investigation was 
undertaken on the Counsel's own initiative or on a 
complaint; (2) the nature of the sanctionable conduct; 
and (3) the name of the person who filed the complaint, 
ifthe investigation was instituted by filing a complaint. 99 
In addition, the judge may present to the Counsel any 
information the judge may wish to present. 100 
After the Counsel finishes the preliminary investiga-
tion, he or she reports the results to the Commission. At 
this point, the Counsel will recommend one of the 
following: that the complaint be dismissed; that the 
judge be offered a private reprimand or deferred disci-
pline agreement by the Commission; further investiga-
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tion; or, that charges be filed against the judge and that 
the Commission conduct a formal proceeding on the 
charges.101 The new rules then detail the procedures for 
each of these options. 102 
l. Dismissal and Warning 
Ifthe Commission opts to dismiss the complaint and 
terminate the investigation, the judge must be noti-
fied.103 The Commission can, however, along with the 
dismissal, issue a warning against future sanctionable 
conduct. 104 The Commission could do this if it felt that 
sanctionable conduct may have been committed by the 
judge but is not likely to be repeated and was "not 
sufficiently serious to warrant discipline."105 A Com-
mittee note to this rule clearly states that a "warning" 
is not a reprimand and does not constitute discipline. 106 
2. Private Reprimand 
The rules provide that the Commission can issue a 
private reprimand if the Commission concludes that the 
judge has committed sanctionable conduct that war-
rants some form of discipline but concludes that "the 
conduct was not so serious, offensive, or repeated to 
warrant formal proceedings and that a private repri-
mand is the appropriate disposition under the circum-
stances."I07 Notably, the judge must waive his or her 
rights to a hearing or to further challenge the findings 
and agree that the reprimand shall not be protected by 
confidentiality in any subsequent disciplinary proceed-
ing.l08 After the reprimand is issued, the complainant 
shall be notified. I09 
3. Deferred Discipline Agreement 
In addition to the reprimand, the new rules provide 
a heretofore unavailable disciplinary mechanism called 
a "deferred discipline agreement." I 10 The Commission 
may utilize this agreement if it finds that the alleged 
sanctionable conduct was not so serious, offensive, or 
repeated to warrant formal proceedings and that the 
appropriate disposition is for the judge to undergo 
treatment or educational training, issue an apology to 
the complainant, or take other corrective action. III As 
with the reprimand, the judge must waive all rights to a 
hearing and agree that future confidentiality of this 
agreement is not guaranteed. 112 The Counsel will then 
monitor compliance with the conditions of the agree-
ment. 113 In addition, the Commission can revoke the 
agreement if it finds that the judge has failed to satisfy 
a material condition of the agreement. 114 Before the 
agreement is revoked, however, the judge will be given 
an opportunity to respond. 115 Again, the Commission 
must notify the complainant that the complaint has 
resulted in an agreement with the judge, however, 
unless the judge agrees, terms ofthe agreement shall not 
be disclosed.116 
4. Further Investigation 
If the Commission approves further investigation, 
the rules require that the judge receive notice that the 
Commission has authorized the further investigation. 117 
In addition, the judge may file a written response. At 
this stage, the Commission may also authorize the 
Counsel to issue a subpoena to compel the attendance 
of witnesses or the production of documents. 118 Any 
court files pertaining to any motion to compel compli-
ance with a subpoena will be sealed. 119 The Commission 
also has the power to grant immunity to any person who 
testifies or produces evidence during the course of the 
investigation. 120 Finally, the new rule states that this 
"second" investigation shall be completed within sixty 
days after it is authorized by the Commission. 121 
5. Filing of Charges and Proceedings Before the 
Commission 
Formal proceedings before the Commission are 
commenced when the Commission findsprobable cause 
to believe that a judge has a disability or has committed 
sanctionable misconduct. 122 A copy of the charge(s) is 
mailed to the judge, and the charge(s) must state the 
nature of the alleged disability, including each Canon of 
Judicial Conduct allegedly violated by the judge, specify 
the alleged facts upon which the charge(s) are based, 
and state that the judge has the right to file a written 
response. 123 The judge then has thirty days to respond 
and has the right to inspect and copy all evidence 
acquired during the investigation. 124 The Commission 
can then proceed with a hearing, whether or not the 
judge appears. Hearings are to be conducted in accor-
dance with the Maryland Rules of Evidence as provided 
in the Maryland Administrative Procedures Act. 125 At 
the hearing, the judge has the right to be represented by 
counsel, present evidence, issue subpoenas for atten-
dance of witnesses or production of documents, and 
cross-examine witnesses. 126 
If the Commission finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that the judge has a disability or has committed 
sanctionable misconduct, it must issue a public repri-
mand or refer the matter to the Court of Appeals; 
otherwise the complaint shall be dismissed. 127 If the 
Commission refers the case to the Court of Appeals, the 
Commission must make written findings offact and give 
its recommendations as to retirement or as to censure, 
removal, or other appropriate discipline. After filing the 
entire record with the Court, these findings must be 
served upon the judge. 128 The Court of Appeals may 
impose the sanction recommended by the Commission 
or any other sanction permitted by law, dismiss the 
proceeding, or remand for further proceedings. 129 The 
Court's decision is evidenced by an appropriate order 
and is accompanied by an opinion. 130 
The new rules also clarify when proceedings before 
the Commission are to be confidential. J3J Specifically, 
upon service of charges alleging sanctionable miscon-
duct, whether or not joined with charges of disability, 
the charges and all subsequent proceedings before the 
Commission on them shall be public. J32 If the charges 
allege only that the judge has a disability, then the 
charges and all subsequent proceedings will remain 
confidential. 133 Any work product and deliberations of 
the Commission not admitted into evidence will, how-
ever, remain confidential. Moreover, all records filed 
with the Court of Appeals will be public, unless the 
court orders otherwise. 134 
III. THE CASE FOR ruDICIAL CONDUCT 
ORGANIZATIONS 
Controversy over the nature and scope of non-
legislative methods for judicial discipline stems from 
differing views as to the "proper extent of judicial 
independence."135 The concept of an independent 
judiciary has always played a central position in this 
country's history. Indeed, the establishment of judicial 
conduct commissions was based in part on the idea that 
respect for the judiciary would be increased if the 
judicial system had the means to clean its own house. 136 
Increasingly, however, critics of the judicial discipline 
commissions argue that judges are no longer capable of 
judging themselves. 137 In support of their assertions, 
they point to evidence that shows diminished public 
confidence in the judiciary. 138 
History has demonstrated, however, that traditional 
remedies to remove judges, including impeachment or 
legislative address, have proved inadequate. 139 Thomas 
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Jefferson described impeachment proceedings as a 
"bungling way of removing judges-an impractical 
way-a mere scarecrow."I40 Legislative remedies are 
also particularly inappropriate to the enforcement of a 
code of judicial conduct or to impose sanctions less 
draconian than removal or suspension. The doctrine of 
judicial discipline thus plays several important func-
tions. In addition to guarding against unconstitutional 
abuses by the legislative and executive branches, it 
permits judges to enforce unpopular laws or protect 
unpopular views without fear of reprisal from the 
legislative or executive branches. Further restraints on 
judicial behavior, beyond the legislative checks of im-
peachment, recall, or address, could create "timidity in 
decisionmaking and impede a progressive approach to 
the administration of justice. "141 
Ultimately, the principle of an independent judiciary 
must remain foremost in any approach to judicial disci-
pline. A well-versed critic of judicial discipline has 
appropriately stated: 
A judicial system operating within the 
judicial branch is better adapted to the 
fair, expeditious, and comparatively in-
expensive disposition of all types of 
misconduct allegations. Not only can a 
judicial tribunal best ensure that the 
accused is afforded the due process of 
law, but there is every reason to believe 
that the judiciary itself is deeply con- , 
cerned with maintaining the highest 
possible standards of conduct within its 
own ranks. 142 
A lazy judge or one who shows significant signs of 
physical or mental impairment will rarely be able to 
handle a full caseload, and if he or she cannot perform 
their judicial functions, he or she can hardly promote, in 
litigants or the public, that confidence.in the judiciary 
necessary for its continuing effectiveness. Similarly 
troublesome is the judge who engages in questionable 
practices or is guilty of minor or major offenses. The 
more complicated the mechanisms for discipliningjudges 
or terminating judicial tenure, the more difficult it is to 
deal with these problems. Given the fallibility of human 
nature, we shall always have judges who misbehave or 
who, having become mentally or physically disabled, do 
not have the grace to retire voluntarily from office. As 
10 - U. Bait. L.F. 126.2 
Jefferson also said, "[f]ew die and none resign."143 
Therefore, it is necessary to have in place some method 
of dealing efficiently and effectively with judicial mis-
conduct and disability.l44 
One of the most important purposes of the Mary-
land Commission on Judicial Disabilities is to maintain 
the public's confidence in the judiciary. One of the 
surest ways to "gain and maintain that confidence is to 
demonstrate to the people that when judicial miscon-
duct or disability does occur, there is a viable institution 
that can cope with it ... with scrupulous impartiali-
ty."145 The ABA has said in its Standards Relating to 
Judicial Discipline and Disability Retirement, the pur-
pose of the discipline systems is not to punish judges, 
but to maintain public confidence in the judiciary, 
preserve the integrity of the judicial process and create 
greater awareness of proper judicial behavior on the 
part of judges themselves. 146 
Although public attention to the problem of judicial 
disability focuses upon the more sensational or scandal-
ous cases of misconduct, the usual case is less dramatic 
and less serious-habitual tardiness, short work hours, 
long vacations, and extreme rudeness to lawyers, liti-
gants, and witnesses. 147 As the California Commission 
on Judicial Qualifications explained in its 1963 report to 
the Governor, among the ten judges who had resigned 
or retired that year during investigation by the Commis-
sion, "'the most common difficulties' were' [d]isabling 
illness with incapacity to perform judicial duties' and 
'weakening of mental faculties connected with ad-
vanced age and reflected in unacceptable derelictions in 
court. "'148 Several years later the California Commis-
sion stated that '" [0 ]ver the years the principal factor 
leading to ... retirement or resignation has been poor 
health preventing the proper performance of judicial 
duties. "'149 
IV. THE FUTURE OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE 
COMMISSIONS 
In order to obtain and maintain public confidence in 
the disciplinary system, visible participation by non-
judges is crucial. An institutional structure involving 
participation by lawyers and non-lawyers at some level 
of the disciplinary process is necessary if the system is 
to be credible in the eyes of the public. Unfortunately, 
because the public cannot respect a disciplinary system 
it cannot see, an inevitable tension will remain between 
the needs for visibility and confidentiality. 150 As Edmund 
Burke observed, "Where mystery begins, justice ends." 
Confidentiality is necessary nonetheless, particularly at 
the investigatory stage, to protect the judge's reputa-
tion against frivolous and unfounded charges and to 
protect persons who make complaints against reprisal. 
In addition, confidentiality insures that members ofthe 
Commission may speak candidly and forthrightly among 
themselves. 
Ultimately, a balance must be struck between the 
need for confidentiality and the need for credibility. The 
disciplinary process must have an appropriate degree of 
visibility. The public must be assured that ethical 
standards are uniformly and evenly enforced and judges 
must develop a heightened awareness of what is expect-
ed ofthem. An informal reprimand may correct fault in 
a single judge, but "it will not enlighten his or her 
brethren about what is required of them and it does 
nothing to promote the credibility of the disciplinary 
system."151 
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